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We explore the extent to which the huge race gap in wealth can be explained with properly
constructed income and demographic variables. In some instances we explain the entire wealth gap with
income and demographics provided that we estimate the wealth model on a sample of whites. However,
we typically explain a much smaller fraction when we estimate the wealth model on a black sample. Using
sibling comparisons to control for intergenerational transfers and the effects of adverse history, we find that
differences in income and demographics are not likely to account for the lower explanatory power of the
black wealth models. Our analysis of growth models of wealth suggests that differences in savings behavior
and/or rates of return play an important role.
Keywords: Black-White Wealth Gap, Siblings, Savings
JEL classifications: D31, J7, D91
1 Introduction
The wealth gap between whites and blacks in the United States is much larger than
the gap in earnings. For example, Menchik & Jianakoplos (1997) document that the
average wealth of black households is 20% of the average wealth of white households in
the 1976 National Longitudinal Survey of mature men (NLSY) and 23% in the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF), even though average black income is 60% and 50% of
average white income in the two samples. The gap in wealth has implications for
the social position of African Americans that go far beyond its obvious implications
for the consumption levels that households can sustain. This is because wealth is a
source of political and social power, influences access to capital for new businesses,
and provides insurance against fluctuations in labor market income. It affects the
quality of housing, neighborhoods, and schools a family has access to as well as the
ability to finance higher education. The fact that friendships and family ties tend to
be within racial groups amplifies the effect of the wealth gap on the financial, social,
and political resources available to blacks relative to whites.
One objective of the paper is to explore the extent to which the huge race gap in
wealth can be explained with income and demographic variables. In some instances
we are able to explain the entire wealth gap provided that we estimate the wealth
model on a sample of whites. However, we typically explain a much smaller fraction
when we estimate the wealth model on a black sample. This finding reflects the fact
that there are large differences between whites and blacks in the relationship of wealth
to income and demographics.
Several previous studies have investigated the sources of the black/white wealth
gap, including Blau & Graham (1990), Smith (1995), Avery & Rendall (1997), and
Menchik & Jianakoplos (1997). However, limitations in the way these previous studies
have examined the contribution of income and demographic patterns to the wealth
gap make conclusions about the importance of these factors and the differences in the
white and black wealth models worth revisiting.
First, the existing studies do not use an adequate measure of permanent income,
which is a key determinant of wealth. Due to data limitations Smith (1995) and
Avery & Rendall (1997) base their wealth models on current income alone rather
than on current and permanent income. Blau & Graham (1990) and Menchik &
Jianakoplos (1997) decompose income into current income and permanent income,
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where permanent income is the component that is predictable given race, sex, age,
education, health status, number of children, and geographic location. Since wealth is
a nonlinear function of income, however, use of the within-cell variation is necessary
to precisely estimate wealth models. Moreover, because high-income individuals tend
to have disproportionately large wealth holdings, failure to accurately measure the
tails of the distribution of permanent income might lead to incorrect estimates of the
contribution of permanent income to the wealth gap. We address this issue by using
panel data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to construct a measure
of permanent income.1
Second, previous studies control for current demographic variables such as marital
status and presence of children but not for demographic histories. Because wealth
at a point in time reflects a flow of savings over many previous years, however, it is
likely to be influenced by demographic histories as well as by current demographic
variables. We address this by constructing marriage histories and child bearing and
rearing histories. In Section 2, we give details on how we construct permanent income
and demographic histories.
In studying the role played by income and demographic variables in the wealth
gap, one must address a number of difficult issues. First, the skewed distribution of
wealth holdings along with the significant fraction of zero or negative wealth holdings
cause problems for standard functional forms, such as the level of wealth and the
log of wealth. Second, demographic variables interact with income variables in de-
termining wealth holdings, thus demanding models that accommodate a rich pattern
of interactions between these two sets of variables. To address these issues we use
both mean and median regression and work with models of the wealth/income ratio
as well as the level and log of wealth (Sections 6 and 7).
A third problem arises from the substantial differences between the white and
black distributions of income and demographics in combination with the fact that
relatively flexible functional forms must be used to capture the nonlinearity of wealth
in income. These two features make it difficult to accurately estimate race-specific
wealth models over the full range of income.2 In Section 9, we address this “nonover-
1Hurst, Luoh & Stafford (1998) also use the PSID to examine race differences in both wealth
holdings and wealth accumulation. They use the average of income over the previous 5 years as
their measure of permanent income. We discuss their results below.
2Henceforth income is short for non-asset income and all amounts quoted are deflated to 1989
US$ using the CPIU.
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lap” problem in several ways. In particular, we propose a new approach that uses the
estimated standard error of predicted wealth for individuals from one group based on
the wealth model for the other group as a guide toward choosing comparison groups
of whites and blacks.
Because of our improved income and demographic variables, we typically explain
more of the wealth gap than previous studies. At the same time, we confirm earlier
results that suggest large disparities in the explanatory power of the wealth models
of whites and blacks.3 In the case of single men and single women, for example, we
can explain the entire race gap in the level of wealth with income and demographics
provided that we estimate the wealth equation on the white sample. In contrast, we
typically explain only a small fraction when we estimate the wealth model on a sample
of blacks. In the case of couples, income and demographics account for 79% of the
wealth gap when we use the wealth mean regression model for whites. We explain only
25% when we use the wealth model for blacks. When we use the ratio of wealth to
permanent income as our measure of wealth, we again explain a much larger fraction
of the wealth gap using the coefficients for whites than the ones for blacks, although
for couples and single females the fraction explained is smaller than in the case of
the level of wealth. Our median regression estimates in Section 7 parallel our mean
regression estimates in Section 6, but the percentages of the gap explained using the
white wealth model are somewhat lower.
In Section 8 we show that race differences in self-employment patterns are a signif-
icant part of a full explanation of black/white wealth differences, although causality
is ambiguous. Separate analyses of the major components of wealth (main home
equity, the value of farms and businesses, and stocks/mutual funds and individual
retirement accounts (IRAs)) in Section 10 confirm our findings for total wealth. All
of these results reflect the fact that the wealth of whites is much more sensitive to
income and demographics than the wealth of blacks.
The fact that we can explain most and in some cases all of the wealth gap with the
white but not with the black wealth model leads us to focus on a second question: Why
are the wealth holdings of blacks less sensitive to income and in demographics than the
wealth holdings of whites? Starting with Blau & Graham (1990), some researchers
have hypothesized that differences in inter vivos transfers and inheritances play a
3See Scholz & Levine (2002) for an up to date survey of the literature on the black/white wealth
gap.
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major part in explaining the wealth gap. Indeed, Smith (1995), Avery & Rendall
(1997), Menchik & Jianakoplos (1997), and Gittleman & Wolff (2001) suggest that
differences in intergenerational transfers contribute to wealth disparities.
In Section 11, we propose a theoretical model of intergenerational linkages to show
how the legacy of discrimination could lead to a link between wealth and income that
is stronger for whites than for blacks. We study this possibility by relating differences
among siblings in current and permanent income and demographics to differences
in wealth. Using sibling comparisons largely neutralizes the effects of disparities
between whites and blacks in inter vivos transfers and inheritances and provides a
way of controlling for the effects of an adverse history on the relative position of
blacks. With fixed-effects coefficient estimates from the white sample we can explain
104% of the race gap in the wealth level, while the corresponding value based on the
model for blacks is only 49%. Our sibling results thus confirm that wealth holdings are
much less strongly related to income and demographic variables among blacks than
among whites. They are also consistent with evidence in Altonji & Villanueva (2001)
based on both the PSID and the survey of Asset and Health Dynamics (AHEAD).
This suggests that little of the difference between whites and blacks in the effect of
income on wealth is due to differences in inter vivos transfers and inheritances.
Other possibilities are that savings rates or the rates of return to assets differ. In
Section 12, we look at the combined effect of these two factors by estimating models
for the growth of wealth as a function of income and demographic factors. In the
case of couples, income and demographic factors explain 74% of the race gap in the
growth of wealth when we use the growth model for whites but only 49% when we
use the growth model for blacks. The discrepancy is even larger (84% versus 30%)
when we study growth in the ratio of wealth to permanent income. These findings
suggest that difference in savings behavior or rates of return on assets play a key
role in explaining the wealth gap. However, the results are not entirely conclusive for
reasons we discuss below.
2 Data
The database is constructed from the main PSID files, the supplemental wealth files,
the marriage history file, and the childbirth and adoption file. The PSID is based
on a random sample of U.S. households in 1968 and a separate low income sample.
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The households were interviewed annually, providing many years of income data and
long demographic histories for the panel members. Wealth data were collected in
1984, 1989, and 1994. The PSID contains a full set of variables only for household
heads (“heads”) and their spouses (“wives”).4 For this reason our analysis is based
on persons who were either a head or a wife in one of the three years for which wealth
surveys were conducted.
We use our samples without weighting when estimating wealth models (see Section
4 for details), but we use the family core weights that are supplied with each wave of
the PSID to make our estimates nationally representative when computing descriptive
statistics (Section 3) and wealth decompositions (Section 5). We assign equal weight
to each of the 1984, 1989, and 1994 wealth surveys when we pool the data.
Real non-asset family income is our measure of current income. We exclude asset
income because it may be affected by prior transfers and because it is a function of
wealth. Our measure of wealth includes home equity, but it excludes Social Security
and pension wealth. These are important exclusions, and it would be desirable to
incorporate them into future research. In Section 10, we separately analyze the major
components of wealth – main home equity (house value net of mortgage balance),
farms/businesses, and stocks/mutual funds and IRAs.5
Throughout, the log wealth (log current income) measures are constructed by
taking the log of the respective values truncated at 50 (1,000). This allows us to keep
observations with zero or negative wealth (current income) in our sample. Our results
for levels, ratios and logs are not sensitive to excluding observations with wealth below
50.
2.1 Measuring Permanent Income
We use the panel data on individuals to construct two measures of permanent income.
They are based on the regression model
yit = Xitγ + eit, (1)
4The PSID convention is that the husband is the household head in a married couple.
5The other components of our wealth measure are checking/savings, credit cards, other real
estate, vehicles, and other savings/assets. See Hurst et al. (1998) for descriptive statistics.
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where yit is either the level or the log of nominal non-asset family income of person
i in year t. (Recall that, given the level of current income yit, the log of current
income is defined as ln max {yit, 1000}.) Xit consists of a fourth-order polynomial in
age (centered at 40), a marital status dummy, an indicator for children, the number
of children, and a set of year dummies. Define eit to be the sum of an individual-
specific effect and an idiosyncratic error term, eit = vi + uit, and assume that the
serial correlation in uit is sufficiently weak to be ignored in computing permanent
income. We estimate the parameters of equation (1) from race- and gender-specific
mean regressions using all observations in which the person was either a head or wife.
Our measure of permanent income is the individual-specific effect vi, estimated as the
mean of the residuals from the regression for each person. This measure is basically a
time-average of past, current, and future income adjusted for demographic variables
and time.6 We dropped individuals with less than 4 observations from the subsequent
analysis to ensure that transitory income and measurement error will have only a
minor effect on our permanent income measures.7
A simple example can be used to illustrate the possible consequences of the differ-
ence between our measure of permanent income and the one used in previous studies.
Let i index individuals and j demographic groups. Suppose wealth W ji is a quadratic
function of permanent income yji ,





2 + εji , α2 > 0.
Suppose that the coefficients α0, α1, and α2 are the same for blacks and whites and
that wealth is a convex function of permanent income. In this case the entire wealth
gap is due to differences in the distribution of income. In line with previous studies,
decompose yji into its expected value y
j∗
i given a set of predictors X
j
i such as education
6An alternative measure of permanent income is based upon nominal non-asset family income
prior to the year of the wealth survey. It makes sense to exclude future earnings to the extent
that individuals are highly uncertain about them and to the extent that income shocks are fairly
persistent. We typically explain as much or more of the wealth gap with this backward-looking
measure than with our usual measure.
7For white males, the 10th percentile of the numbers of observations used in the computation
of the permanent income measure is 7, the median is 20, and the 90th percentile is 27. The cor-
responding numbers are 7, 16, and 27 for black males, 8, 22, and 27 for white females, and 7, 19,
and 27 for black females, respectively. Between 15.2% and 32.7% of individuals in each race-gender
group have been observed for 27 years, over the full course of the PSID. Our results are not sensitive
to requiring 2 instead of 4 years of income data.
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i . In this case,
E(W ji |yj∗i ) = E(E(W ji |yji )|yj∗i ) = α0 + α1yj∗i + α2(yj∗i )2 + α2V ar(uji |yj∗i )
and the stochastic regression function relating W ji to y
j∗
i is
W ji = α0 + α2V ar(u
j






2 − V ar(uji |yj∗i )] + 2α2ujiyj∗i + εji .
Suppose the limited range of yj∗i forces the researcher to choose linear specification,
as do Blau & Graham (1990) and Menchik & Jianakoplos (1997). Then if wealth is a
convex function of income and permanent income is lower for blacks than whites, one
will obtain a flatter slope for blacks than whites. This difference will be reinforced
if V ar(uji |yj∗i ) is an increasing convex function of yj∗i , which is the case in our data.
As a consequence, using coefficients estimated on one group to predict for the other
group will underestimate wealth holdings, leading one to underestimate the fraction
of the group difference in wealth that is due to the group difference in income.
We have used the methodology of Blau & Graham (1990) and Menchik & Jianako-
plos (1997) to measure permanent income. As discussed in Section 7.3 of Altonji &
Doraszelski (2001), the use of panel data to construct permanent income measures
increases the percent of the gap in wealth levels that can be attributed to differences
in income and demographic characteristics. Not surprisingly, we experienced difficul-
ties with Blau & Graham’s (1990) approach when we allowed for nonlinear effects of
permanent income.
2.2 Constructing Demographic Histories
We combine the main PSID files with the marriage history file and the childbirth
and adoption file to create a demographic history for each individual that describes
past and present marriages and child bearing and rearing. In the case of couples,
the demographic histories describe the number of marriages (separate for heads and
spouses), the tenure of the current marriage, and the number of children born or
adopted (separate for heads and spouses). In the case of singles, the demographic
histories indicate whether the recent marriage ended in widowhood, whether the most
recent marriage ended in divorce, and the number of children born or adopted. We
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complement the demographic histories by a rich set of current demographic variables.
2.3 Treatment of Outliers
The wealth data contain a number of extremely high or extremely low observations.
We eliminated extreme values by first estimating separate median regression models
for whites and blacks using the specification described in Section 4 below, pooling
the residuals from those models, and dropping the observations corresponding to the
bottom 0.5% and top 0.5% of the residuals. The procedure was conducted separately
for couples, single men, and single women. We used separate trimming procedures
for the level, ratio, and log models. Eliminating the outliers dramatically reduced
the sampling error of our mean regression models, at the likely cost of some bias.
Our main findings are not sensitive to excluding the outliers but standard errors are
dramatically affected, and the size of the gap between whites and blacks is reduced
somewhat. All results are for the trimmed sample unless noted otherwise.
3 Race Differences in Wealth, Income, and Demo-
graphics
We begin by providing some basic facts about race differences in wealth and the key
income and demographic variables. To save space, we present descriptive statistics
for the pooled sample of observations for 1984, 1989, and 1994.8
Table 1 provides the mean, median and standard deviation for the level of wealth
(W ), the wealth/permanent income ratio (W/y), and the log of wealth (ln W ). (Recall
that, given the level of wealth W , the log of wealth is defined as ln max {W, 50}.) It
also reports descriptive statistics for the levels and logs of current and permanent
income in 1989 US$. Outliers are included so that the numbers will better reflect
population totals. The corresponding descriptive statistics for the trimmed sample
can be found in Table A1 of Altonji & Doraszelski (2001).
8The ratio of black to white wealth remains roughly constant over time for couples and single
females but increases dramatically from 0.14 in 1984 to 0.33 in 1994 for single men. With respect
to permanent income black couples seem to lose some ground (the ratio is falling from 0.72 for both
heads and wives in 1984 to 0.65 for heads and 0.67 for wives in 1994). Finally, the ratio of current
income drops from 0.81 in 1984 to 0.67 in 1994 for single females.
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In the case of couples, the mean of wealth is 53,472 for blacks and 211,602 for
whites, a ratio of 0.25. The race gap for current non-asset family income is much
smaller with a mean of 30,153 for blacks and 41,519 for whites, a ratio of 0.73. This
is reflected in our permanent income measures, which have a mean of 32,450 for black
heads and 46,949 for white heads. The permanent income values are 30,086 and
43,097 for black and white wives, respectively. The black/white ratio of permanent
income is 0.70. Moreover, the distributions for current and permanent income are
much more concentrated than the distributions for wealth. The much larger racial
disparity in wealth is reflected in the wealth/permanent income ratios. The mean
wealth/permanent income ratio for black couples is 1.80, which is only 37% of the
value of 4.87 for white couples.
We also report descriptive statistics for main home equity, the value of farms and
businesses, as well as the value of stocks, mutual funds, and IRAs in Table 1. For
each of these three components of wealth we report the mean, median and standard
deviation for the households who have nonzero values as well as the overall mean
and standard deviation when including the zero values. The race gap in home equity
is smaller than the gap in total wealth. With zero values included, the mean of
home equity is 25,293 for black couples, which is 43% of the value of 58,462 for white
couples. In contrast, only 4% of black couples have assets in a farm or a business,
while 20% of white couples have such assets. Including the zero values, black couples
hold an average of 2,689 in farms or businesses, which is only 7% of the mean of
39,149 for whites. Finally, black couples hold only 4,073 in stocks, mutual funds, and
IRAs, which is only 15% of the corresponding mean value of 27,589 for whites. Only
15% of black households hold wealth in this category, while 40% of white households
do.
The situations for single men and for single women mirror the one for couples.9,10
9The mean of permanent income for single females exceeds the mean of current income dramat-
ically. In part, this reflects the fact that our income measure includes years in which the individual
was married, although the income observations that go into permanent income are adjusted for the
effects of marital status. Since the average age for single black females is about the same as for
black couples while the average age for single white females is higher than that for white couples,
the differences in permanent income do not seem to reflect the earlier position of singles in the life-
cycle. Instead, they seem to be due to inherent differences in earnings potentials across demographic
groups. Similar observations hold for single men.
10In the trimmed samples the minimum and maximum of wealth are −138, 918 and 7, 460, 000 for
white couples, −128, 016 and 1, 441, 646 for black couples, −42, 009 and 1, 930, 283 for single white
males, −55, 223 and 627, 530 for single black males, −37, 652 and 602, 429 for single white females,
and −49, 031 and 516, 500 for single black females.
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In Table 2 we present descriptive statistics for our demographic variables. The
values for the trimmed sample are very close to the values for the full sample and are
omitted for brevity.
The means for many of the variables differ considerably across races. In the case
of couples, for example, the average number of children currently living in the family
unit is higher for blacks (1.21) than for whites (0.92). The difference in the total
number of own or adopted children is even bigger, with an average of 2.86 for black
heads and 2.43 for white heads. This points to the potential importance of controlling
not only for current demographics but also for demographic histories.
Table 2 finally confirms a large literature showing that the black self-employment
rate is only about one third of the white self-employment rate and that this ratio has
been relatively constant for the past 70 years (Fairlie & Meyer 1997). As we show
in Section 8, this variable has a substantial association with wealth, although the
direction of causality is not clear.
4 Econometric Models
Let i = 1, . . . , N j index individuals or couples and j demographic groups, where
j is b for blacks and w for whites. Let W ji denote wealth, Y
j
i a vector of income
variables (including current income yit and permanent income yi), and X
j
i a vector
of demographic variables. Since we have panel data on wealth, a number of variables
in addition to yit depend on the calendar year t as well as i, but we leave the time
subscript implicit.
Our basic wealth model specifies the level of wealth to be linear in the income and






w + Xwi β
w + εwi , (2)





b + Xbi β
b + εbi , (3)
where αw0 , α
w, and βw are the regression intercept and slope parameters for whites, εwi
is the error term, and αb0, α
b, βb, and εbi are the corresponding parameters and error
term for blacks. Separate sets of regressions are specified for couples, single males,
and single females, so the slopes and intercepts depend on sex and marital status as
well as on race. The observations are pooled across the 1984, 1989, and 1994 wealth
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surveys.
In Sections 6 and 7, we report mean regression (OLS) and median regression




j to be the conditional
mean or the conditional median regression function. There are a number of reasons
why median regression estimates are of interest. First, one may simply be more
interested in the median of wealth than in the mean of wealth for persons with a given
set of characteristics. Second, the skewness and fat tails of the wealth distribution
suggest that it may be easier to estimate conditional medians (Koenker & Bassett
1978, Narula & Wellington 1982).
Given that the level of wealth is used as the dependent variable, equations (2) and
(3) impose additive separability between the income and demographic variables. We
work with the levels of wealth because much of the public discussion is couched in
terms of levels and because of the large fraction of the population with zero or negative
wealth. However, we doubt that there is any sensible specification of consumption
preferences over the life course, with or without bequests, that would imply that
the conditional mean of the level of wealth is additively separable in income and
demographic variables. It implies, for example, that the effect of having another child
on wealth does not depend on permanent income, which seems unlikely. Consequently,
we also work with the log of wealth and the ratio of wealth to permanent income of
the head as the dependent variable. The log model implicitly allows for multiplicative
interactions in the equation for the level of wealth. However, the log specification is
poorly suited as a wealth model because wealth holdings are frequently close to zero
or even negative. We deal with this problem by setting the values of wealth below
50 to 50 prior to taking logs. The ratio specification avoids this problem altogether
and implies that the effects of demographic variables are proportional to permanent
income.
Our choice of control variables is driven largely by previous studies of wealth
differences, although our specifications of permanent income and marriage and child
bearing and rearing histories are more elaborate. We chose to start with and stick to
a fairly broad set of variables rather than “fish around” for a shorter list of variables
that are statistically significant.
In the case of couples, the income controls included in Y ji are current family non-
asset income, permanent income of the husband, permanent income of the wife, the
squares of current income, head’s permanent income, and wife’s permanent income, as
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well as the products of current family income with the head’s and the wife’s permanent
income.11 The income controls in the case of singles are similar except that spouse
variables are excluded. We also experiment with cubic income specifications below.
Most of our demographic controls are listed in Table 2.12,13 In addition, we include
fourth-order polynomials in the age of the husband and in the age of the wife (centered
at 40) in Xji .
14 Finally, we include year dummies for the 1984 and the 1994 wealth
surveys.
It is useful to discuss our choice of variables in light of economic theories of wealth.
The basic life cycle model of consumer behavior augmented to include a bequest mo-
tive suggests that wealth at a point in time will be influenced by the level and timing
of earnings over the lifecycle, rates of time preference, rates of return, and consump-
tion needs of the household. This suggests a role for both current and permanent
earnings, powers of age, and various demographic variables that may influence the
level and timing of consumption needs and perhaps are related to rates of time pref-
erence. Some of the variables we include, such as health status, are likely to operate
through several of these channels. We do not have direct measures of rates of return.
Recent work emphasizes precautionary savings and risk aversion, suggesting a role for
variables measuring risk exposure, tolerance, insurance and ability to borrow against
future income. We do not have direct measures of these factors either. Some of the
race differences in the effects of variables that we include may, however, be related to
these factors.15
11Recall that the permanent incomes of husbands and wives who have been married for many
years are based on the same income data and are essentially the same. We include them separately
to allow for the fact that income of the husband and the wife prior to marriage may have different
effects on wealth in marriage. We obtain very similar wealth decompositions when we use the average
of the husband’s and the wife’s permanent income.
12We include the wife’s work hours because it has been used in some of the previous studies,
although there are some obvious endogeneity issues that may lead to different biases for whites and
blacks. The wealth decompositions in Table 3 below are not very sensitive to dropping it.
13Smith (1995) finds that “healthier households are wealthier ones” for both blacks and whites.
Hence, controlling for health status helps to explain the wealth gap. The question of causality,
however, is tricky.
14Because we estimate wealth models by demographic group, our age controls implicitly account
for group differences in life expectancy.
15See Browning & Lusardi (1996) for a survey of the consumption and savings literature. Scholz &




We evaluate the explanatory power of our wealth models using a slightly modified re-
gression decomposition (Blinder 1973, Oaxaca 1973) that allows for median regression
models and accommodates the use of population weights in computing the wealth gap.










and θj = (αj0, (α
j)′, (βj))′. Equations (2) and (3) can be written as
W ji = Z
j
i θ
j + εji , j = w, b,
where the definition of θj and εji depends on whether we use mean or median regres-







j) denote the mean of the predictions for individuals in
demographic group j, where θ̂j is an estimate of θj. For a given family type, e.g.
couples, write















































The first term measures what the contribution to the wealth gap of race differences
in the explanatory variables would be if the relationship between wealth and the
explanatory variables was given by θ̂b, the coefficient vector for blacks. The second
term evaluates the contribution to the wealth gap of differences between whites and
blacks in the wealth coefficients using the distribution of the explanatory variables
for whites. The first term thus represents the part of the wealth gap Ŵw• − Ŵ b• that
is “explained” by differences between blacks and whites in the explanatory variables,
while the second term represent the unexplained part of the wealth gap.16 We contrast
16DiNardo, Fortin & Lemieux (1996) and Barsky, Bound, Charles & Lupton (2002) discuss ways of
decomposing group differences into the effects of observed characteristics and unobserved differences
in the context of nonparametric statistical models. The major difficulty with these approaches is
that they are hard to apply when the number of explanatory variables is large, as in our case.
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the decomposition based on the above equation with the decomposition





































which uses the coefficient vector for whites to measure the part of the wealth gap that
is explained by differences in income and demographics.
Suppose for the moment that we assign equal weights to all observations, ωji =
1/N j. In the context of a mean regression model, this implies Ŵ j• = W̄
j
• , where W̄
j
•




i = 0 by construction. In general, this is
not true for median regression models, so the sample median differs from the mean
of the conditional medians. Furthermore, because we estimate the model parame-






i differs from zero even for mean regression models.
6 Mean Regression Results
In this section we present decompositions of the race gap in the level of wealth (W ),
the wealth/permanent income ratio (W/y), and the log of wealth (ln W ) into a com-
ponent that is explained by differences in income and demographic variables and an
unexplained component. Since our focus is on the wealth decompositions rather than
on the estimated wealth models (as given by equations (2) and (3)) themselves, we
do not discuss the coefficients estimates in any detail. The coefficient estimates can
be found in Tables A2, A3, and A4 of Altonji & Doraszelski (2001).
6.1 Level Models
The top row of Panel A in Table 3 reports decompositions of the wealth level Wi for
couples. The mean (standard error) of the wealth gap Ŵw• − Ŵ b• is 116,795 (4,535).17
Using the coefficient estimates for the white equation θ̂w = (α̂w0 , (α̂
w)′, (β̂w)′)′ we find
that the race difference in income and demographics explains 92,589 (4,855) of the
wealth gap, or 79%. We obtain strikingly different results with the black equation.
17As we pointed out in Section 5, Ŵw• − Ŵ b• need not equal W̄w• − W̄ b• , the difference in the
weighted sample means of wealth. From Table A1 of Altonji & Doraszelski (2001), the latter figure
is 115,228(=187,589-52,361).
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Using θ̂b = (α̂b0, (α̂
b)′, (β̂b)′)′ we are only able to explain 29,009 (4,509) or 25% of the
wealth gap.
Our results for single men (see second row of Panel A of Table 3) echo the findings
for couples. Using the coefficient estimates for whites we find that black men would
have 20% more wealth than white men if they had the same income and demographics
as white men. This result suggests that the large wealth gap simply reflects racial
differences in income streams, human capital variables, and current and past demo-
graphic variables. However, we again obtain very different results when we use the
wealth model for blacks to perform the wealth decomposition. In this case only 31%
of the gap of 40,365 (2,613) is attributable to income and demographics.
As the third row of Panel A of Table 3 shows, for single women the race gap in
wealth is 46,575 (2,204). The model for the white sample implies that black women
would have 103% of the wealth that white women hold if they had the same income
and demographics as white women. However, the wealth model for blacks implies
that only 33% of the gap is attributable to income and demographics.
The large discrepancy between the white and the black wealth models in the
degree to which racial differences in income and demographic variables explain the
wealth gap is a key theme in our analysis. It reflects the fact that wealth differences
among blacks are much less sensitive to differences in income and demographics than
wealth differences among whites.
To gain further insight into this key property of the wealth equations, we investi-
gate the effect of a unit increase in current income yit and permanent income yi at the
sample mean (pooled over race) of yit and yi (see Table A2 of Altonji & Doraszelski
(2001)). The effect of a unit increase in current income is .64 for white couples and .69
for black couples. The effect of increasing the husband’s (wife’s) permanent income
by one dollar is 1.04 (1.98) for whites and -.02 (.91) for blacks. The combined effect
of increasing yit, yi of the husband, and yi of the wife by one dollar is 3.66 for whites
and 1.58 for blacks. The point here is that these income derivatives tend to be much
larger for white couples than for black couples. The same is true for single males and
single females. It also holds when we evaluate the income derivatives at 0.5 or 1.5 of
the sample mean instead of at the sample mean. In fact, the gap in the sensitivity of
wealth to income is substantially higher above the mean than below the mean.18
18The effect of a unit increase in current and permanent income is 2.04 for whites and 2.04 for
blacks at 0.5 of the pooled sample mean, which is the only exception to the rule of larger marginal
effects for whites. At 1.5 of the mean the values are 5.28 for white couples versus 1.12 for black
16
Although there is some variation across variables (in part because of sampling
error), the coefficients on the other variables in the model also tend to be larger in
absolute value for whites than for blacks. To establish this point, we computed the
indexes Yiα̂
w and Yiα̂
b of the income variables for each observation in the combined
sample of blacks and whites. The regression of Yiα̂
b on Yiα̂
w and a constant is 0.284
with an OLS standard error of 0.0026. A similar regression involving the Xiβ̂
w and
Xiβ̂
b indexes of the demographic variables shows that differences in demographics
have a stronger association with wealth levels for whites than for blacks. The slope
coefficient in a regression of Xiβ̂
b on Xiβ̂
w and a constant is 0.354 with an OLS
standard error of 0.0016. When one forms the index using both income and demo-
graphic variables and regresses Ziθ̂
b on Ziθ̂
w and a constant, the slope coefficient is
.305 (.0023). The patterns are very similar for single men and single women, with
the exception that for single men the coefficient on the index of income variables is
close to 1.
In summary, we find that most or all of the race gap in the wealth level for single
men and single women and a substantial portion of the gap for couples would dis-
appear if blacks and whites had the same distribution of income and demographic
variables and the white wealth equation held for blacks. However, the wealth mod-
els for blacks exhibit much less income sensitivity, indicating that both the race gap
in income and demographics and race differences in the distribution of wealth condi-
tional on income and demographic variables play important roles in the gap in wealth
levels.19
6.2 Ratio Models
In Panel B of Table 3 we present results pertaining to the ratio of wealth to permanent
income Wi/yi. For white couples, the mean of the predicted value of Wi/yi is 4.18
(0.08), while the corresponding value for black couples is 1.74 (0.10). The total gap
couples. The values for single white males and single black males are 1.00 versus 0.46 at 0.5 of the
mean, 1.55 versus .39 at the mean, and 2.11 versus 0.31 at 1.5 times the mean. The values for single
white females and single black females are 1.95 versus 0.82 at 0.5 of the mean, 1.75 versus .68 at the
mean, and 1.55 versus 0.54 at 1.5 times the mean.
19In their wide ranging study of wealth accumulation, Hurst et al. (1998) use the PSID to examine
race differences in the level of wealth. Their results are broadly consistent with ours. However, Hurst
et al. (1998) do not directly address the question of differences in the form of the wealth function
because they pool whites and blacks and only allow the intercept of the wealth model to depend on
race. See footnote 17 of Altonji & Doraszelski (2001) for details.
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is 2.44 (0.13). Demographic and income characteristics account for 57% of this when
we use white coefficients but only 12% when we use the black coefficients. In the case
of single males the total gap is 0.70 (0.07). Demographic and income characteristics
explain 119% of the gap when we use the white coefficients but only 27% when we
use the black coefficients. In the case of single females, the corresponding numbers
are 78% and 45%.
6.3 Log Models
In Panel C of Table 3 we report decompositions for ln Wi. The explanatory variables
are the same as for the level and ratio models except that we substitute the log of
current income and the log of permanent income for the levels of these variables. For
couples the mean of the log wealth gap is 1.51 (0.06). Using the wealth model for
whites we can explain 77% of this gap. Using the wealth model for blacks we can
explain 72%. For single women, the mean of the gap in the log of wealth is 2.57
(0.08). Using the white equation the portion of the gap that is explained by income
and demographics is 1.68 (0.10) or 65% of the total. The explained gap based on
equation for blacks is also 65% of the total gap. For single men the gap in log wealth
is 2.00 (0.10). Using the white equation the portion of the gap that is explained by
income and demographics is 1.71 (0.10), or 85% of the total. The explained gap based
on the equation for blacks is 1.53 (0.12), or 76% of the total. In percentage terms, the
explanatory variables account for more of the race gap in log wealth for single men
than for either single women or couples. The 85% figure when the log wealth model
for whites is used is particularly striking, and well in excess of the figures reported
by Blau & Graham (1990).
6.4 Summary
Overall, income and demographics explain a substantial part of the wealth gap be-
tween whites and blacks. Most or all of the race gap in the wealth level for single men
and single women and a substantial portion of the gap for couples would disappear
if blacks and whites had the same distribution of income and demographic variables
and the white wealth equation held for blacks. Although the relative explanatory
power of the regression models for blacks is higher when Wi/yi is the explanatory
variable than when Wi is the explanatory variable, the results for Wi/yi are generally
18
consistent with the results for Wi.
The results based upon the white log model are less dramatic than the results
for the white level wealth itself, and the portion of the gap explained using the black
model is much larger in case of the log model than in case of the level model. However,
this disparity between the log results and the results for levels and ratios should not
be overstated. In particular, since the model for ln W implies a multiplicative model
for W , the huge race gap in the mean of log wealth together with the substantial
fraction of the gap that is not explained by income and demographics implies that
the response of wealth to income and demographic variables is much smaller for blacks
than for whites. This point comes through most starkly in the case of single females.
From Panel C of Table 3 the total gap in the mean of ln W is 2.57. The regression
models for whites and blacks both explain 65% of this gap, leaving an unexplained gap
of .90 (= .35× 2.57). Consider the most extreme case in which the slope coefficients
of the log models for whites and blacks are equal and all of the unexplained gap is
due to the intercept. Assume that the distribution of the errors in the log models
do not depend on race, income, and demographics. Then for whites the derivative
of wealth with respect the income and demographics will be e.90 ≈ 2.46 times the
corresponding derivative for blacks.20 Consequently, the evidence based upon the log
models is broadly consistent with the evidence for levels and ratios.
7 Median Regression Results
We measure the wealth gap as the population-weighted average of the difference
between the conditional median of wealth based on the median regression for the
white sample and the distribution of characteristics in the white sample and the
median regression and distribution of characteristics for the black sample, Ŵw• − Ŵ b• .
We refer to this as the gap in the conditional median of wealth. Table 4 presents the
decompositions. In the case of couples, the total gap in the median is estimated to
be 84,794 (2,824), which compares to a gap in the mean of wealth of 116,795 (4,535).
The total gap in W/y is 1.81 (0.07) for medians and 2.44 (0.13) for means. The gaps
in the median of ln W and the mean of ln W are more similar (1.36 (0.05) versus
1.51 (0.06)), which is not surprising given that the log transformation reduces the
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skewness of the wealth distribution.
In the case of couples the income and demographic variables account for 68% of the
wealth gap in the weighted average of the conditional medians if the median regression
function for whites is used (Panel A). In contrast, the median wealth regression for
blacks implies that characteristics account for only 22% of the gap in the conditional
median of wealth. For single men the white median regression implies that 85%
of the gap is explained, while the black median regression implies a figure of only
41%. The corresponding figures for single women are 74% and 42%. Overall, income
and demographics account for a somewhat smaller percentage of the race gap in the
conditional median of the wealth level than in the conditional mean when the white
model is used, particularly in the case of single men and single women. When the
median wealth model for blacks is used, the percentage explained is slightly lower
than the corresponding value for the conditional mean in the case of couples but
higher for single men and women.
The results for W/y in Panel B of Table 4 are similar to the results for levels,
except that the portion of the gap explained by the white median regression model
is substantially smaller for both couples and single females.
The results for ln W in Panel C of Table 4 are basically similar to the results based
on mean regression and also imply that the wealth of whites is much more sensitive
to income and demographics than the wealth of blacks once the implications of the
log specification and the large unexplained gap are taken into account.
8 Self Employment and the Wealth Gap
If causality runs mainly from self employment to wealth, then it is desirable to control
for self employment in the analysis, especially to the extent that the effects of past
discrimination on the self-employment rate of blacks lingers today (see for example
the discussion in Bates (1997) and Oliver & Shapiro (1997)). However, some studies
of the race gap in self employment attribute part of the self-employment gap to a lack
of financial capital. If the causality runs from wealth to self employment, then it is
less clear that self employment should be controlled for.
The coefficient on self employment is quite substantial. In the case of white
couples, the coefficients on the dummies for self employment of the head and self em-
ployment of the spouse are 150,010 and 47,916 respectively in the model for wealth
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levels. The corresponding coefficients in the model for blacks are 57,415 and -3,784.
The combination of a much higher self-employment rate for whites (.18 versus .05
in the case of heads and .08 versus .03 in the case of spouses) and a much stronger
association between self employment and wealth for whites make a substantial con-
tribution to the race gap in wealth. When we remove the self-employment indicators
from the wealth model for couples, the fraction of the gap in W explained using
the white wealth model declines from 79% to 64%. The fraction of the gap in W/y
explained declines from 57% to 41%.21 Differences in self-employment rates make a
much smaller contribution to the wealth gap for single males and single females. The
percentage of the gap in W explained using the white wealth model is 114% for males
and 100% for females even when self employment is excluded. Overall, the evidence
suggests that race differences in self-employment patterns are a significant part of a
full explanation of black/white wealth differences, although causality is ambiguous.
9 Alternative Samples and Evaluation Points for
the Wealth Gap
Thus far we have reported decompositions of the wealth gap using the full distribution
of the income and demographic variables for the white and the black populations to
estimate and evaluate the models. In this section we explore the possibility that a
lack of overlap between the white and black samples is leading to unreliable estimates,
particularly when the black coefficients are used with white characteristics, because
we are extrapolating too far out of sample.
First, we performed decompositions at the sample means of the explanatory vari-
ables for whites and the sample means for blacks rather than using the full distribution
for each group. As discussed in Section 8 of Altonji & Doraszelski (2001) we continue
to find a large difference between the black and white equations in the role assigned
to differences in characteristics. This means that the right tail of the distribution of
current income and/or permanent income is not driving our results.
Second, we tried the novel approach of selecting comparison groups on the basis of
the estimated standard errors of the conditional mean of wealth given the explanatory
variables from the two equations. The basic idea is that persons with low standard
21The corresponding values with and without self employment when the black wealth models are
used are 25% and 19% for W and 12% and 5% for W/y.
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errors have characteristics that are closer to the center of the multivariate distribution
of the observable variables that matter for wealth. We use the estimate of the variance
matrix of the black coefficient estimates to calculate prediction errors for each white
sample member and then pick the ones that have the lowest estimated prediction
error. Blacks are treated analogously. There is a tradeoff between reduction in sample
size for the comparisons and the objective of focusing on whites who fall within the
distribution of characteristics of blacks, and vice versa. Somewhat arbitrarily, we
chose 50% as the percentage of the white and the black samples to keep for the
wealth decompositions. (The model estimates are based on the full samples.) The
results are presented in Table 5 of Altonji & Doraszelski (2001). They confirm our
basic finding that differences in the white and black wealth models play a key role in
the wealth gap.
Third, we address the possibility that the effects of current and permanent income
on wealth is not quadratic over the full range of the distribution of whites and blacks.
If it is not, then the difference in the income distributions of whites and blacks
might lead to bias when we evaluate the black regression function using the white
sample, and vice versus. Since there is every reason to believe that wealth would be
a smooth function of income, adding additional polynomial terms should provide an
adequate solution. When we add third powers in current and permanent income, our
decompositions based on the white wealth model are not affected very much. However,
the decompositions based on the black wealth model become quite imprecise in the
case of single women. There is not enough overlap in the income distributions at the
high end, a least not given the other covariates in the model. (See Section 7.1 of
Altonji & Doraszelski (2001) for details.)
As a final robustness check we start with the trimmed sample and prior to es-
timation of the wealth models eliminate observations if current income is negative
or if permanent income is less than 100. We also eliminate observations for whites
with current or permanent income above the corresponding 98th percentile values of
in the black sample. In the case of couples, we screen on the basis of both the hus-
band’s permanent income and the wife’s permanent income.22 We include cubics in
both current income and permanent income. The gap in W is 85,644, which is below
the gap of 116,795 in the full sample because we have chosen whites who fall more
22The distributions of the head’s permanent income (in thousands) in the restricted samples are
as follows:
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within the income distribution of blacks. Income and demographics explain 64% of
the gap between whites and blacks using the white wealth model and 26% using the
black wealth model. The comparable figures for single males are 135% and 19% and
97% and 28% for single females. The comparable figures for W/y are 50% and 19%
for couples, 142% and 25% for single males, and 61% and 36% for single females.
We obtain very similar results using a quadratic specification. We also obtain very
similar results if we restrict the white sample to lie below the maximum values of
current and permanent income in the black sample rather than the 98th percentile
values. Overall, the results are quite similar to those in Table 3, especially when one
accounts for the fact that eliminating high income whites reduces potential size of
the explained gap.
Barsky et al. (2002) take a nonparametric approach to addressing the potential
for bias from misspecification of the relationship between wealth and income in the
presence of differences in the white and black income distributions. They adjust for
differences in income by reweighting the observations on whites to have the same
income distribution as the black sample and find that differences in income account
for 64% of the wealth gap. In contrast, when they use a quadratic specification they
explain 72% of the gap using the model for whites. (They do not report results for
the cubic case. The nonparametric regression functions they report would appear
to be well approximated by a cubic.) This difference is not negligible, but given
sampling error we do not consider it to be a clear indication of a problem with
our parametric approach. Their estimate of the gap explained is below most of
our estimates for the wealth level. However, while space prevents a full discussion
of the differences between their study an ours, it is important to note that they
pool family types without intercept or slope shifts and only control for permanent
earnings and age, while we treat married couples, single men, and single women
separately and also control for current income, self employment status, education,
and a rich set of demographic characteristics and use non-asset income rather than
earnings as our resource measure. Barsky et al. (2002) argue that there are not enough
min 1% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 99% max
white couples 1 17 28 34 41 49 56 63 65
black couples 5 11 17 22 30 39 48 68 97
single white males 7 16 25 30 37 43 48 52 52
single black males 5 11 16 20 25 31 39 61 87
single white females 11 15 22 27 33 38 42 44 45
single black females 7 11 15 19 23 28 35 48 69
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blacks at the high end of the white income distribution to ask whether differences in
characteristics explain less of the gap when the black wealth function is used. Our
sample is much larger than theirs. Our robustness checks above suggest strongly that
in our samples overlap in the distributions is sufficient to permit decompositions using
the black wealth model, particularly if one restricts the range of income variation in
the white sample. The discrepancy between the white and black wealth models in the
importance of income and demographic variables appear to be real rather than an
artifact caused by inaccurate extrapolation out of sample. However, further research
on this key issue is needed.
10 Race Differences in the Components of Wealth
Why are the coefficients so different across the black and white specifications? One
hypothesis is that the relationship differs for some forms of wealth but not for others.
Table 5 reports mean regression decompositions of main home equity (house value
net of mortgage balance), wealth in farms/businesses, and stocks/mutual funds and
IRAs. We restrict attention to couples. The regressors are the same as the ones used
for couples in our other wealth models.
On average whites hold 32,309 (978) more home equity than blacks (56,859 (657)
versus 24,550 (724), Panel A of Table 5), which is not surprising given the difference
in home ownership rates across races.23 The white regression model explains 88%
of this gap compared to the 79% explained for total wealth in Table 3. Again, the
amount explained using the model for blacks is much smaller – only 30%.
The unconditional black/white difference in asset holdings relative to the mean for
either group is significantly larger for business wealth and stocks. The wealth model
for whites explains only 73% of the gap in farm/business wealth even though self-
employment status of the husband and wife are controlled. Once again, the fractions
explained by the black regression equation are negligible – only 18%.
In the case of stocks, the mean for whites and blacks are 23,290 (915) and 2,670
(314) respectively. The total gap of 20,620 (1,558) is 7.7 times the mean for blacks. We
can attribute 88% of the difference in stock to income and demographic characteristics
23Charles & Hurst (2002b) provide evidence that differences between blacks and whites in the
ability and willingness of parents to provide a downpayment plays a role in the lower transition rate
from rental status to home ownership for blacks. Segal & Sullivan (1998) study the role of race,
other demographic variables, and income in trends in home ownership.
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when we use the wealth model for whites but only 20% of the difference when we use
the black wealth model. The gap in this component is particularly important given
the equity premium. Even if blacks and whites received the same return on any
given asset, the fact that equity is underrepresented in the portfolios of black couples
suggests that overall returns are lower for blacks.
We obtain qualitatively similar results for the ratios of the various wealth compo-
nents to permanent income of the head, although the explanatory power of both the
white wealth model and the black wealth model is lower for W/y (Panel B of Table
5).
Overall, the results for the components of wealth closely parallel the results for
total wealth.
11 Intergenerational Transfers and the Wealth Gap:
Evidence for Siblings
Our results show substantial differences in the sensitivity of wealth holding to income
and demographic variables. Because both income and demographic characteristics of
whites are more conducive to wealth holding, we assign higher fractions of the wealth
gap to differences in income and demographics when we use the white wealth equa-
tions. There are at least three possible explanations for why wealth holding may be
more sensitive to characteristics for whites than for blacks. First, whites may enjoy a
higher rate of return on assets, in which case the same level of savings and intergener-
ational transfers would lead to larger wealth levels, magnifying underlying differences
that are associated with income and demographics. Menchik & Jianakoplos (1997)
provide some limited evidence that blacks experience a lower rate of return on assets
of a given type. However, the evidence on this point is far from conclusive (see also
Gittleman & Wolff (2001)). Second, savings of blacks may be less sensitive to the
income and demographic variables that we use. Third, inheritances of housing, finan-
cial assets and businesses and/or inter vivos transfers are larger among whites than
among blacks because slavery and the legacy of racial discrimination have inhibited
the accumulation of wealth in the black population.24 Studies by Smith (1995), Av-
ery & Rendall (1997), Menchik & Jianakoplos (1997), and Gittleman & Wolff (2001)
24See Oliver & Shapiro (1997) for a historical overview of legal and social barriers to wealth holding
by blacks.
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indeed suggest that differences in inheritances explain part of the race gap, although
none of these studies pays much attention to the fact that there are large discrep-
ancies between whites and blacks in the sensitivity of wealth holding to income and
demographics.25
In this section we use data on siblings to explore the possibility that differences
in intergenerational transfers are the source of differences in wealth holding. Using
siblings largely neutralizes the effects of differences between whites and blacks in inter
vivos transfers and inheritances and provides a way of controlling for the effects of
adverse history on the position of blacks relative to whites with similar income and
demographics.26
11.1 Econometric Models
Let k index families and i siblings within a family. We estimate models of the form






j + ujk + ε
j
kit, j = b, w, (4)
where ujk is a family-specific fixed effect. For reasons that will become clear later,
we have made the wealth survey year subscript t explicit. If inheritances and inter
vivos transfers are correlated with average income and demographic characteristics




kit. Since inheritances and
transfers are larger for whites than blacks, the resulting bias may be larger for whites.
By controlling for factors that are common to siblings, we reduce this problem.
To see how historical barriers to wealth holding faced by blacks affect the estimated
slopes of wealth models and how fixed effects models reduce the influence of these
barriers, consider the following simple model of inheritances and inter vivos transfers.
Suppose that in a steady state the wealth of parents, including inheritances and
25A fourth possibility is that blacks face higher prices than whites. In this case, our measure of
real income is overstated for blacks. However, the available evidence suggests that consumer prices
are not very different for blacks than for whites (Richburg Hayes 2000).
26The coefficients in the sibling equations will be downward biased to the extent that parents try
to compensate for differences in income of children. However, Menchik (1980), Menchik & David
(1983), Wilhelm (1996) and other studies show that inheritances are evenly split in about 70% of the
cases and that the division is only weakly related to income in the cases where the split is not even.
Inter vivos transfers among siblings tend to compensate for income differences, but the coefficient
relating transfer amounts to income differences is relatively small. See McGarry & Schoeni (1995)
and Altonji, Hayashi & Kotlikoff (1997) for evidence.
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accumulated savings, is related to permanent income y according to
W0 = αy0,
where we have suppressed family and survey year subscripts and use the subscript
0 to denote the parents. Suppose also that parents pass on the fraction φ of their
wealth. Furthermore, assume that the relationship between the permanent incomes
of parents and children is
y0 = ρy1, ρ > 0,
where the subscript 1 denotes the child. For whites, the child’s wealth is the sum of
savings out of gifts and inheritances and savings out of income,
W1 = s(φW0 + gy1) = (sαφρ + sg)y1,
where g converts permanent income into the discounted sum of lifetime income and
s is the savings rate. Suppose that slavery and discrimination severely limited the
ability of blacks to accumulate wealth. Then the relationship between wealth and
permanent income of the black parents can be modelled
W0 = d(αy0), 0 < d < 1,
where d reflects the effect of discrimination. Hence, the equation relating wealth to
income for blacks is
W1 = s(φW0 + gy1) = (sαφdρ + sg)y1.
The coefficient (sαφdρ + sg) on y1 in the above equation for blacks is smaller than
the coefficient (sαφρ + sg) for whites. However, once the effect of parental wealth
is held constant using a family-specific fixed effect, the influence of the term sφW0
is eliminated and the coefficient on y1 is sg for both whites and blacks. A similar
argument can be made for intergenerational links in demographic patterns. Hence, if
the analyses with and without fixed effects give similar answers, then we can conclude
that race differences in gifts and inheritances that are correlated with income and
demographic variables do not explain our finding that wealth levels are more sensitive
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to income and demographic variables in the case of whites than in the case of blacks.27
11.2 Results
To obtain adequate sample sizes, we pool observations on single men, single women,
and couples and add control variables for the three demographic groups. For couples
we use only the head’s variables rather than separate variables for the husband and
the wife. We do not weight observations in computing the decompositions.
When one includes a family fixed effect, the effects of permanent income are identi-
fied only by cross-sibling variation, but the effects of current income, self-employment
status, marital status, the number of children, and other explanatory variables that
change over time are identified by a mix of cross-sibling variation and cross-time
variation. OLS without fixed effects uses cross-family, cross-sibling, and cross-time
variation. One might argue that cross-person variation should have a stronger rela-
tionship with wealth than cross-time variation. Moreover, for the purpose of explain-
ing the race gap in wealth the effects of permanent differences are more important
than transitory differences. For this reason, we also examine estimates that empha-
size cross-sibling variation. A simple way to use only cross-sibling variation in the key
income and demographic variables is to estimate the wealth model after taking person
means across wealth surveys for all of the variables. However, with time averaging
it becomes difficult to distinguish the effects of current and permanent income, and
much variation in variables such as the survey year dummies and age is lost.
To save space, we do not report the detailed regression estimates. However, it is
interesting to note that although the race gap in the effect of income on wealth is
a little smaller for FE than OLS it is somewhat larger for FE-Means than OLS.28
27An alternative strategy is to add controls for the permanent income and wealth of parents.
Conley (1999) controls for such variables in a model for the log of wealth and finds that he can
explain the entire wealth gap. However, his analysis is likely to overestimate the effects of parental
income and wealth because he excludes permanent income measures for the adult children and
ignores the effects of unobserved family specific heterogeneity in savings behavior. Furthermore
his sample size is very small and contains similar percentages of whites and blacks who are self
employed (in contrast to a huge literature and the evidence in Table 2). Also, he works with a
pooled regression model and reports standard errors that are so large that the results are not very
informative. Further research incorporating parental wealth is needed.
28The fixed effect estimate of the marginal effect of a one dollar increase in both current income
and permanent income is 1.49, 2.26, and 2.82 when both are set to 0.5, 1.0, and 1.5 times their
respective means for the pooled sibling sample. The corresponding fixed effects estimates for blacks
are 0.78, 1.62 and 2.46. The corresponding FE-Means estimates are 1.30, 2.02 and 2.73 for whites
and .98, .99 and .99 for blacks. The corresponding OLS estimates are 1.77, 2.32 and 2.88 using the
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Overall, there is not much evidence that race differences in the correlation between
income and inheritances plays a large role in the stronger relationship between income
and wealth for whites.
There is an interesting pattern in coefficients on self employment. The OLS and
FE estimates of the effect of self employment are 70,013 and 49,116 for whites. The
OLS-Means and FE-Means estimates are 85,232 and 60,751. Both reporting error
and the fact that successful businesses are longer lasting may underlie the fact that
the estimates are larger when we work with individual means. The fact that the
estimates decline when sibling fixed effects are included is consistent with a role for
inheritances in the effects of self employment but it may also be due to a greater role
for reporting error. The OLS and FE estimates for blacks are 14,230 and 11,854 and
the OLS-Means and FE-Means estimates are 12,116 and 9,804. Thus, adding family
fixed effects closes the race gap in the link between self employment and wealth from
73,116 to 50,948 when individual means are taken and from 55,783 to 37,262 when
means are not taken. Overall, the self-employment results for siblings confirm our
earlier results suggesting that self employment may play a substantial role in the
wealth gap. The comparison of the estimates with and without fixed effects suggests
that parental wealth or other family background factors can explain about one third
of the huge race gap in the relationship between self employment and wealth.29
In Table 6 we report decompositions of the wealth gap using the siblings sample
using FE and FE-Means estimates of the wealth models. For purposes of comparison,
we also report OLS and OLS-Means estimates. The results are quite striking. For the
wealth level we explain 111% and 54% of the gap using the white coefficients and the
black coefficients, respectively, using OLS, 104% and 49% using FE, 107% and 36%
using OLS-Means, and 97% and 23% using FE-Means. Basically, the FE and FE-
Means results closely correspond to the results without fixed effects, and mirror the
pattern we obtained above for the samples of couples, single females, and single males.
We continue to explain more of the wealth gap using the white coefficients than the
black coefficients, particularly when wealth and income are specified in levels. The
W/y results are very similar to the W results.30 If anything, the gap in the fraction of
white model and .89, 1.52 and 2.15 using the black model.
29Fairlie & Meyer (2000) consider estimates of intergenerational links in self employment and
conclude that most of the racial discrepancy in self-employment rates is due to “forces that reduce
current black self employment besides the initial conditions of low black self employment.” Dunn &
Holtz-Eakin (2000) find that parental wealth has a small direct effect on self employment of sons.
30The fixed effects results for ln W are also similar to our earlier results in Table 3.
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wealth explained using the black wealth model and the white wealth model is larger
when we use cross-sibling variation to eliminate the effects of common inheritances
and transfers. There is little evidence that differences in factors such as inheritances
or inter vivos transfers that are likely to vary across families provide an explanation
for the racial difference in the sensitivity of wealth to income and demographics. We
wish to stress, however, that they may play a role in differences in wealth intercepts
and appear to matter for self employment. This leaves differences in savings behavior
and/or rates of return as potential sources of the race difference in wealth models.
We examine them in the next section.
There is an important caveat to our analysis. The additively separable form of
equation (4) is standard in the literature, but may not be adequate if income and
inheritances interact in the wealth function, as would be the case if there is a strong
bequest motive. The results for W/y are less subject to this objection.31
12 Race Differences in the Growth of Wealth
We now turn to models of wealth accumulation. In Table 7 we present unweighted
means and standard deviations of the measures of the 5 year changes in wealth for
couples. The 5 year changes reflect the growth in wealth between the 1984 and 1989
surveys or between the 1989 and 1994 surveys. We focus on the trimmed statistics
the last two columns. These show a much more rapid rate of accumulation for whites
than for blocks. For example, the mean 5 year change in W/y is 1.28 (3.71) for
whites but only 0.45 (2.11) for blacks, a gap of 0.83. The large difference could reflect
differences in savings, differences in rates of return on assets, or a combination of the
two. Table 7 also reports the mean growth rates for some categories of wealth. There
are dramatic differences between whites and blacks in growth of housing wealth and
especially in stock/mutual funds/IRAs and in business wealth.
We now turn to the issue of how much of the difference in accumulation rates can
be explained by differences in income and demographics. The growth models include
the variables that appear in the wealth models plus the changes in the measures of
current income, region, SMSA, wife’s work hours, children, dependents, health status,
and self employment. To insure reasonable sample sizes we confine the analysis to
31Altonji & Matzkin (2001) provide a panel data estimator for nonseparable models that could be
used to address the issue.
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couples. We focus on total wealth because the precision for the components is not
sufficiently large. We do not weight observations in computing the decompositions.
The wealth change decompositions are reported in Table 8. In the case of W , in-
come and demographic variables explain 74% of the difference in accumulation rates
when the accumulation model for whites is used. Using the accumulation model for
blacks, the same factors explain 49% of the gap. The corresponding figures for growth
in the wealth/permanent income ratio, W/y, is 84% based on the white accumula-
tion model and 30% based on the black accumulation model. In summary, we find
that income and demographic characteristics explained more of the gap in wealth
accumulation when the wealth model for whites is used.
What is responsible for the substantial difference between blacks and whites in
the sensitivity of wealth levels and wealth/permanent income ratios to income and
demographic variables? Difference in the rate of return to wealth may be part of
the story, because blacks have larger percentages of their wealth in home equity and
smaller percentages in stocks and business wealth. However, the differences seem
too great to be attributable to differences in rate of return alone although further
research on this issue is needed. The wealth change regressions suggest that differences
in savings rates are an important factor. Recall that our sibling results show that
inheritances and gifts are not a major factor in the black/white differences in the
wealth models. This fact, in combination with the substantial race differences in
the wealth growth models, suggests that differences in savings behavior (possibly in
combination with rates of return) may be an important source of the wealth gap and
of black/white differences in the wealth models.32
Note that the results for logs in Panel C of Table 8 present a challenge to the
above interpretation. The results for logs show that 77% of the wealth is explained
when the black wealth growth model is used while only 5% of the gap is explained
when the white log wealth growth model is used. These results are not consistent
with the results in Panels A and B and cannot be attributed to the fact that the log
model is basically a multiplicative specification. We do not have a good explanation
for this, but note that many of the coefficients in the model are poorly estimated and
32We have also estimated equations for W that include a lagged value of W along with the other
variables used in the savings regressions. However, given the presence of lagged wealth, the high
explanatory power of the models is largely due to the race gap in lagged wealth, and so it is hard to
know what the economic significance of the explained gap is. See footnote 29 of Altonji & Doraszelski
(2001) for details.
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the explanatory power of both the white model and black model is low. In general,
the low explanatory power of the growth models makes us cautious in interpreting
the decompositions, especially in the case of the models for blacks.33
In independent work, Gittleman & Wolff (2001) analyze race differences in wealth
accumulation using PSID data similar to ours. They allocate the growth in wealth
to the effect of portfolio mix on asset returns, asset returns given portfolio alloca-
tions, savings rates, inheritances, income, and household composition changes. They
distinguish between savings and asset returns by constructing a specific measure of
savings from questions about “active savings”, while we use wealth changes with-
out attempting such a decomposition. They pool household types, use a much more
limited set of regressors, and measure income differently. They find that race differ-
ences in savings rates are entirely explained by differences in income and demographic
differences. Because they pool whites and blacks and use population weights, their
regression estimates should be close to those for the white sample. Thus, their results
for savings are qualitatively consistent with our results for the change W/y, although
we only explain 84% of the gap in the change in W/y.
13 Conclusions and Further Questions
We study the sources of the huge wealth disparity between blacks and whites using
improved income and demographic measures. When we use the level of wealth as the
dependent variable we explain a large part of the racial disparity in wealth holdings
with income and demographic variables provided that we estimate the wealth model
on a sample of whites. On the other hand, we can explain only a small fraction of the
race gap when we ask the question: If the relationship between wealth and income
and demographics for whites was the same as it is for blacks, how much wealth
would whites hold? The reason is that the regression coefficients relating income and
demographic characteristics to wealth are in general much smaller for blacks. This
implies that less of the race gap in wealth is explained by the race gap in income and
demographics. Our results are robust to a number of modifications to the estimation
methodology, functional form, and comparison groups.
33The adjusted R2’s of the growth models are only about .05 for the growth in lnW . The adjusted
R2 is .0946 for whites and .0458 for blacks when the dependent variable is the growth in W/y and
.3023 for whites but only .0607 for blacks when the dependent variable is the growth in W .
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We find that a higher self-employment rate and a stronger link between self em-
ployment and wealth for whites than for blacks make an important contribution to
the wealth gap between white and black couples. Separate analyses of the major
components of wealth confirm our findings for total wealth. Again wealth holdings
of whites are much more sensitive to income and demographics than wealth hold-
ings of blacks. Overall, our results suggest that race differences in the sensitivity of
wealth to income and demographics may be as important as the gap in income and
demographics themselves in understanding black/white differences in wealth.
What underlies the substantial race differences in the sensitivity of wealth holding
to income and demographics? To answer this question we analyze data on siblings
from the PSID. Our study is the first (to our knowledge) sibling fixed-effects analysis
of wealth holdings and is of independent interest. The fact that we obtain similar
results when we relate sibling differences in wealth to sibling differences in income and
demographics suggests, perhaps surprisingly, that differences in inter vivos transfers
and inheritances are not the main reason the wealth model coefficients differ by race.
This would seem to leave race differences in savings behavior and/or rates of return
as a default explanation.
We find that income and demographic differences explain a substantial part of
the difference between whites and blacks in the growth in the level of wealth and in
the ratio of wealth to permanent income when we use the wealth model for whites,
but relatively little when we use the wealth model for blacks. This result suggests
important differences between whites and blacks in the effects of income and demo-
graphics on savings and/or rates of return, although our conclusion is tentative for a
number of reasons discussed above. We suspect that differences in savings behavior is
the main factor. However, the fact that blacks hold disproportionately low fractions
of their portfolios in stocks and business wealth suggests that differences in rates of
return may also play a role.
A large research agenda remains. Further descriptive explorations of the race
gap in wealth holdings and wealth accumulation using other data sets and other
econometric approaches are needed. However, more detailed studies of the underlying
causes of race differences in wealth accumulation behavior are also needed. We close
by sketching a few possibilities.
Our sibling approach to the study of the effects of parental resources on the wealth
models should be augmented by a study of the sources of intergenerational links in
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wealth along the lines of recent work by Charles & Hurst (2002a). The role of self
employment and small business formation has already received a substantial amount
of attention in the literature and deserves more.
A second possibility is that differences in permanent income in conjunction with
lower life expectancies among blacks and a higher replacement rate of private income
with publicly provided social security and health benefits depress the incentive to save
for retirement of blacks relative to whites, as discussed by Smith (1995).34 Differences
in life expectancy may also play a role, although we suspect it to be minor.
A third possibility revolves around the implications of differences in the income
distributions of the friends and relatives of whites versus blacks. The basic idea is that
savings and wealth accumulation are influenced by economic links to other household
and friends that are motivated by altruism or other factors. The effects of ties to other
households on savings depends on the level and distribution of resources and needs.
We know that wealth accumulation is highly nonlinear in income. An explanation
for this is that the marginal utility of household consumption declines in spending,
leading households to accumulate resources as a hedge against future consumption
needs, fluctuations in income, and uncertainty about the lifespan. Unspent resources
are left to children or to charity late in life or upon death. However, if a high income
family has strong ties to needy relatives and friends, it may make transfers rather
than accumulate wealth. Also, social pressure on the relatively well off to provide
assistance may be stronger in communities where needs are greatest. This will reduce
the private incentive to accumulate for those who are not very altruistic. The net
result may be that the wealth of a household with an extensive network of needy
family members and friends may increase less with income than the wealth of a
household with a network of well off friends and relatives.
Finally, the lower incomes of black households and of their friends and relatives
may lead to greater dependence on social transfer programs relative to own resources
and private transfers, holding permanent income and other household characteris-
tics constant. Eligibility requirements for many transfer programs, including welfare
programs and public housing, discourage wealth accumulation. This may reduce the
private incentive to accumulate wealth.35
34In preliminary work using the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), John Karl Scholz (Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, Madison) has found that the race gap is much smaller for pensions than other
forms of wealth (personal communication). This could have spillovers into holding of assets.
35See Powers (1998), Gruber & Yelowitz (1999), and Hurst & Ziliak (2001) for direct empirical
34
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for wealth and income variables
Log of wealth including main home 10.97 11.37 9.48 10.23 8.95 9.56 7.25 7.78 9.19 10.03 6.88 6.91
equity
Wealth including main home equity 211602 86764 53472 27611 62211 14224 15439 2387 70599 22676 15099 1004
Ratio of wealth including main home 4.87 2.23 1.80 0.89 1.33 0.32 0.58 0.07 2.04 0.59 0.66 0.04
equity to permanent income
Value home 70082 50202 38129 25101 50050 34305 29543 23000 57438 40000 30737 23869
Value farm/business 191367 47738 60075 35804 70205 16734 46366 6694 80793 35804 25758 9548
Value stock/mf/ira 68914 15061 26837 9548 33783 7000 8623 4774 38816 10000 8851 3580
Value home (incl. 0) 58462 40162 25293 13128 18335 0 6475 0 27534 0 9157 0
Value farm/business (incl. 0) 39149 0 2689 0 8195 0 990 0 4375 0 103 0
Value stock/mf/ira (incl. 0) 27589 0 4073 0 8619 0 581 0 9138 0 519 0
Ratio of value of home 1.78 1.35 1.38 0.99 1.12 0.71 1.13 1.00 1.70 1.18 1.43 0.99
to permanent income
Ratio of value of farm/business 3.95 1.15 1.63 1.00 1.64 0.35 2.00 0.25 2.57 1.06 1.23 0.57
to permanent income
Ratio of value stock/mf/ira 1.37 0.34 0.69 0.24 0.61 0.14 0.28 0.12 1.08 0.24 0.32 0.11
to permanent income
Ratio of value home (incl. 0) 1.48 1.05 0.92 0.46 0.41 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.43 0.00
to permanent income
Ratio of value farm/business (incl. 0) 0.81 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
to permanent income
Ratio of value of stock/mf/ira (incl. 0) 0.55 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.00
to permanent income
Whether home 0.83 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.37 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.30 0.00
Whether farm/business 0.20 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Whether stock/mf/ira 0.40 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.06 0.00
Log of taxable non-asset income 10.35 10.43 10.06 10.20 9.68 9.80 9.12 9.33 9.27 9.30 8.92 8.96
Permanent log-income 10.72 10.75 10.32 10.42 10.56 10.65 9.91 10.02 10.52 10.57 9.94 9.95
Total taxable non-asset income 41519 34000 30153 26783 22452 17978 14204 11283 14618 10942 10590 7784
Permanent income 46949 43655 32450 30357 45317 42818 28413 27217 38939 37138 25045 23843
Spouse: Permanent log-income 10.66 10.70 10.25 10.37
Spouse: Permanent income 43097 39418 30086 27790
Number of observations
    from 1984 wealth survey
    from 1989 wealth survey






























































































(11.26) (4.36) (3.12) (1.68) (7.50) (1.88)
(140253) (153775) (38141) (208029)
1036
3178
Notes: Computed from the pooled sample using weights.  The weights are normalized so that for each subgroup the means are estimates of the average 
of the population means for 1984, 1989, and 1994. We show the mean (left), median (right), and standard deviation for each variable by demographic 
group. "Value of stock/mf/ira" refers to the value of shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual funds or investment funds, including stocks in IRAs. 
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(std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.)
Northeast region 0.23 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.14
Midwest region 0.29 0.18 0.29 0.22 0.28 0.23
South region 0.30 0.60 0.28 0.54 0.28 0.53
West region 0.18 0.07 0.22 0.09 0.21 0.10
SMSA 0.48 0.64 0.55 0.73 0.57 0.71
Spouse: Annual hours worked 935.83 973.32
(931.97) (956.57)
Age 48.03 47.64 40.99 38.66 53.09 43.87
(15.16) (15.45) (17.57) (14.61) (20.59) (17.29)
Spouse: Age 45.41 44.53
(14.69) (14.57)
Number of kids in FU 0.92 1.21 0.11 0.18 0.37 1.04
(1.13) (1.34) (0.46) (0.58) (0.82) (1.28)
Whether kids in FU 0.49 0.58 0.07 0.11 0.21 0.53
Number of dependents outside FU 0.25 0.29 0.35 0.56 0.15 0.10
(0.77) (0.93) (0.80) (1.02) (0.62) (0.42)
Whether dependents outside FU 0.14 0.15 0.21 0.30 0.09 0.07
Health: fair or poor 0.14 0.30 0.16 0.26 0.25 0.31
Spouse: Health: fair or poor 0.12 0.28
Education: grade school 0.08 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.15
Education: high school incomplete 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.16 0.28
Education: high school diploma 0.24 0.28 0.22 0.29 0.28 0.25
Education: high school diploma plus 0.29 0.24 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.25
Education: college degree 0.17 0.06 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.05
Education: advanced or professional degree 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.02
Spouse: Education: grade school complete 0.05 0.09
Spouse: Education: high school incomplete 0.12 0.24
Spouse: Education: high school diploma 0.36 0.27
Spouse: Education: high school diploma plus 0.28 0.29
Spouse: Education: college degree 0.13 0.05
Spouse: Education: advanced or professional degree 0.06 0.05
Number of marriages 1.18 1.12 0.64 0.55 0.97 0.71
(0.49) (0.42) (0.72) (0.67) (0.75) (0.65)
Spouse: Number of marriages 1.18 1.12
(0.47) (0.45)
Tenure of current marriage 21.81 20.54
(15.31) (14.87)
Most recent marriage ended in widowhood 0.10 0.10 0.36 0.21
Most recent marriage ended in divorce 0.31 0.18 0.28 0.24
Number of children born or adopted 2.43 2.86 1.11 1.76 2.00 2.61
(1.67) (2.31) (1.67) (2.11) (2.00) (2.37)
Spouse: Number of children born or adopted 2.42 2.85
(1.65) (2.41)
Self-employed 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.02
Spouse: Self-employed 0.08 0.03
Number of siblings 2.30 3.73 2.32 3.63 2.56 3.78
(2.65) (3.96) (2.71) (3.99) (2.91) (4.02)
Spouse: Number of siblings 2.26 3.62
(2.65) (3.76)
Number of observations 7700 2509 1415 1130 2744 3178
    from 1984 wealth survey 2561 910 442 335 898 1036
    from 1989 wealth survey 2777 931 502 426 912 1090
    from 1994 wealth survey 2362 668 471 369 934 1052
Number of couples/singles 3444 1280 924 701 1562 1587
Notes: Computed from the pooled sample using weights (see Table 1). "SMSA" refers to standard metropolitan statistical area, 
"FU" refers to family unit.
Table 3: Mean regression decompositions of the race gap in wealth



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
couples 166708 74119 49912 78921 116795 92589 29009
(3344) (4280) (3064) (6335) (4535) (4855) (4509)
(79%) (25%)
single males 54164 5763 13800 26205 40365 48402 12405
(2421) (4787) (982) (2281) (2613) (5435) (2154)
(120%) (31%)
single females 59268 11119 12693 28260 46575 48149 15567
(2048) (3896) (816) (4411) (2204) (4447) (4163)
(103%) (33%)
couples 4.18 2.78 1.74 2.03 2.44 1.40 0.29
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10)
(57%) (12%)
single males 1.18 0.34 0.47 0.67 0.70 0.83 0.19
(0.06) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.05)
(119%) (27%)
single females 1.73 0.78 0.51 1.06 1.21 0.94 0.54
(0.06) (0.14) (0.03) (0.19) (0.07) (0.14) (0.18)
(78%) (45%)
couples 10.99 9.82 9.48 10.56 1.51 1.17 1.09
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
(77%) (72%)
single males 8.96 7.25 6.96 8.49 2.00 1.71 1.53
(0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
(85%) (76%)
single females 9.21 7.53 6.64 8.31 2.57 1.68 1.67
(0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
(65%) (65%)
A. Wealth measure: Level of wealth
B. Wealth measure: Ratio of wealth to permanent income
C. Wealth measure: Log of wealth
Notes: Computed from the trimmed pooled samples using weights (see text for details on the trimming). The regression coefficient estimates are estimated 
from the trimmed pooled samples without sample weights (see Tables A2-A4 for mean regression results). Columns (1) and (2) are based on coefficient 
estimates from the white sample, columns (3) and (4) on coefficient estimates from the black sample. Column (1) predicts wealth holdings for whites, 
column (3) for blacks. Column (2) uses the white coefficient estimates with the black sample to calculate counter factual wealth holdings for blacks, column 
(4) the black coefficient estimates with the white sample to calculate counter factual wealth holdings for whites. Column (5) is the difference between 
columns (1) and (3). Column (6) is the difference between columns (1) and (2), column (7) the difference between columns (4) and (3). The percentage gap 
explained is in parentheses in column (6) and in column (7). It is 100 times column (6) (column (7)) divided by column (5). Standard errors account for 
arbitrary forms of heteroscedascity and correlation across time and persons from the same 1968 household.
Table 4: Median regression decompositions of the race gap in wealth





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
couples 118326 60301 33532 52378 84794 58057 18846
(2578) (2219) (1153) (6024) (2824) (1414) (5175)
(68%) (22%)
single males 33374 12418 8600 18756 24774 20996 10156
(2757) (2505) (1339) (3464) (3065) (2335) (2544)
(85%) (41%)
single females 35704 11837 3612 17090 32092 23867 13479
(2485) (1728) (488) (4662) (2533) (4170) (3463)
(74%) (42%)
couples 2.97 2.02 1.16 1.44 1.81 0.96 0.28
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12) (0.07) (0.04) (0.11)
(53%) (15%)
single males 0.66 0.32 0.25 0.44 0.41 0.34 0.19
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
(83%) (46%)
single females 1.03 0.50 0.13 0.51 0.90 0.53 0.38
(0.12) (0.04) (0.02) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.10)
(59%) (42%)
couples 11.23 10.30 9.87 10.75 1.36 0.93 0.88
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08)
(68%) (65%)
single males 9.32 7.49 7.03 8.95 2.28 1.82 1.92
(0.07) (0.15) (0.09) (0.20) (0.12) (0.09) (0.14)
(80%) (84%)
single females 9.66 7.84 6.55 8.69 3.11 1.82 2.13
(0.05) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
(58%) (69%)
Notes: Computed from the trimmed pooled samples using weights (see text for details on the trimming). The regression coefficient estimates are 
estimated from the trimmed pooled samples without sample weights. See Table 3 for the definition of columns (1) through (7). Standard errors are 
obtained via bootstrapping and account for arbitrary forms of heteroscedascity and correlation across time and persons from the same 1968 
B. Wealth measure: Ratio of wealth to permanent income
A. Wealth measure: Level of wealth
C. Wealth measure: Log of wealth
Table 5: Mean regression decompositions of the race gap in wealth components (couples sample)



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
home equity 56859 28320 24550 34201 32309 28539 9651
(657) (1278) (724) (1513) (978) (1135) (1237)
(88%) (30%)
farm/business 24060 7957 2120 6095 21940 16103 3975
(1099) (2138) (353) (737) (1154) (1899) (603)
(73%) (18%)
23290 5077 2670 6724 20620 18213 4054
(915) (1780) (314) (656) (968) (1581) (537)
(88%) (20%)
home equity 1.48 1.13 0.95 1.02 0.53 0.35 0.07
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
(66%) (13%)
farm/business 0.58 0.28 0.07 0.14 0.51 0.30 0.07
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
(58%) (14%)
0.52 0.29 0.07 0.15 0.45 0.23 0.09
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
(51%) (19%)
Notes: Computed from the trimmed pooled samples using weights (see text for details on the trimming). The regression coefficient estimates are 
estimated from the trimmed pooled samples without sample weights. The dependent variable is the indicated component of wealth. See Table 3 for the 
definition of columns (1) through (7). Standard errors are based on OLS formula. 
B. Wealth measure: Ratio of wealth component to permanent income





Table 6: Mean regression decompositions of the race gap in wealth (siblings sample)


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FE 64321 15119 17081 40258 47240 49202 23176
(1160) (4697) (603) (2686) (1308) (5611) (5639)
(104%) (49%)
FE on means 64281 18591 16963 27858 47317 45689 10895
(1446) (7299) (677) (3546) (1596) (8806) (4671)
(97%) (23%)
OLS 64321 11666 17081 42766 47240 52655 25685
(1789) (3733) (794) (3774) (1957) (4031) (3455)
(111%) (54%)
OLS on means 64463 13350 16898 34052 47564 51112 17154
(1865) (4874) (781) (3435) (2022) (5041) (3251)
(107%) (36%)
FE 1.30 0.55 0.49 0.73 0.82 0.75 0.25
(0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11)
(92%) (31%)
FE on means 1.30 0.58 0.48 0.56 0.82 0.72 0.08
(0.03) (0.15) (0.02) (0.10) (0.03) (0.19) (0.12)
(88%) (10%)
OLS 1.30 0.46 0.49 0.86 0.82 0.85 0.37
(0.04) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07)
(104%) (45%)
OLS on means 1.30 0.47 0.48 0.72 0.82 0.82 0.24
(0.04) (0.10) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.07)
(101%) (30%)
FE 9.49 7.60 7.13 8.86 2.37 1.90 1.73
(0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.12) (0.04) (0.13) (0.16)
(80%) (73%)
FE on means 9.45 7.70 7.12 8.88 2.33 1.75 1.76
(0.03) (0.17) (0.04) (0.15) (0.05) (0.24) (0.21)
(75%) (75%)
OLS 9.49 7.45 7.13 9.07 2.37 2.04 1.95
(0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
(86%) (82%)
OLS on means 9.46 7.42 7.11 9.07 2.34 2.03 1.95
(0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
(87%) (83%)
Notes: Computed from the trimmed pooled siblings samples without sample weights (see text for details on the trimming). The regression coefficient 
estimates are estimated from the trimmed pooled siblings samples without sample weights. "OLS" denotes an OLS estimate, "FE" an OLS-fixed effects 
estimate, and "FE on means" a OLS-fixed effects estimate based on the mean of all observations for a given individual. The regression decompositions 
use all observations for a given individual regardless of the estimation method. See Table 3 for the definition of columns (1) through (7). Standard errors 
account for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and family-specific serial correlation across siblings and time.
C. Wealth measure: Log of wealth
B. Wealth measure: Ratio of wealth to permanent income
A. Wealth measure: Level of wealth









(std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.) (std. dev.)
∆Log of wealth including main home equity (ln) 0.34 0.30 0.39 0.15
(1.72) (2.25) (1.62) (2.05)
∆Wealth including main home equity 33560 255 36160 8237
(530443) (316361) (178330) (60593)
∆Ratio of wealth including main home equity to permanent income (rt) 1.24 0.18 1.28 0.45
(10.61) (10.87) (3.71) (2.11)
∆Value home (incl. 0) 8577 3676 8953 3723
(59644) (30790) (57784) (30785)
∆Value farm/business (incl. 0) 6722 211 3645 281
(282714) (17480) (115905) (17359)
∆Value stock/mf/ira (incl. 0) 15909 1077 12048 1079
(130397) (16398) (74094) (16412)
∆Ratio of value home (incl. 0) to permanent income (rt) 0.38 0.25 0.39 0.25
(1.39) (1.21) (1.33) (1.21)
∆Ratio of value farm/business (incl. 0) to permanent income (rt) 0.19 0.01 0.10 0.02
(5.14) (0.65) (2.18) (0.65)
∆Ratio of value stock/mf/ira (incl. 0) to permanent income (rt) 0.35 0.03 0.32 0.03
(1.88) (0.41) (1.64) (0.41)
Number of observations 4227 1216 4174 1214
    Wealth growth from 1984 to 1989 2099 644 2073 643
    Wealth growth from 1989 to 1994 2128 572 2101 571
Number of couples/singles 2594 789 2574 788
           Full Sample Trimmed Sample
Notes: Computed without sample weights. The right two columns refer to the full sample, the left two columns to the trimmed 
sample (see text for details on the trimming). "Value of stock/mf/ira" refers to the value of shares of stock in publicly held 
corporations, mutual funds or investment funds, including stocks in IRAs. (ln) indicates that the corresponding descriptive 
statistics are computed from the log-trimmed sample and (rt) refers to the ratio-trimmed sample. The remaining descriptive 
statistics are computed from the level-trimmed sample.
Table 8: Mean regression decompositions of the race gap in growth of wealth (5 year changes, couples sample)

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
36160 15366 8237 21967 27922 20794 13730
(2306) (5511) (1685) (4668) (2856) (5006) (4353)
(74%) (49%)
1.28 0.58 0.45 0.70 0.83 0.70 0.25
(0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.17) (0.08) (0.11) (0.16)
(84%) (30%)
0.39 0.37 0.15 0.33 0.23 0.01 0.18
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.06) (0.05) (0.13)
(5%) (77%)
C. Wealth measure: Log of wealth (first difference)
B. Wealth measure: Ratio of wealth to permanent income (first difference)
A. Wealth measure: Level of wealth (first difference)
Notes: Computed from the trimmed pooled samples without sample weights (see text for details on the trimming). The regression 
coefficient estimates are estimated from the trimmed pooled samples without sample weights. The dependent variable is the first 
difference of the indicated wealth measure between survey years. See Table 3 for the definition of columns (1) through (7). Standard 
errors are based on OLS formula. 
